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We consider a model of law enforcement where homogenous, risk neutral, and corruptible
inspectors are responsible for monitoring citizens who may have committed criminal acts. A
welfare maximizing, budget constrained government can implement appropriate wage policies
to prevent collusion, but we nd that governments characterized by high administrative costs
in administrating nes, or by a low ability to spot and prosecute corruption, may prefer to
let corruption happen. By allowing citizens to avoid all monitoring by reporting their own
violations rst, the government is able to increase welfare by hiring fewer inspector, and in some
instances by shifting from a regime of corruption to a regime where there is none. Moreover,
self reporting fully eliminates any deadweight losses that arise from the incentive schemes when
inspectors are risk averse. In order for self-reporting to have these e¤ects, it is necessary that
the government maintains also an optimal incentive scheme for its inspectors.
1. INTRODUCTION
Fines, monitoring, incentives, e¢ ciency wages have all been tools described in the
literature on corruption as e¤ective in preventing the exchange of bribes between a
bureaucrat  often an inspector tasked with enforcing the law  and a citizen. To this
list, our paper adds a new tool: allowing the citizen to avoid all monitoring by reporting
his own violations directly to the principal (the government).
More precisely, this paper will make four points using a modied model of law
enforcement a la Kaplow and Shavell (1994). Our model features a welfare maximizing
government in charge of enforcing the law by means of a number of inspectors who
monitor the population and can be bribed by them. With this setup, the rst point
we make is that collusion of law enforcement is entirely and costlessly preventable by
a wage policy to the police force that includes contingency payments based on the
reports made by the inspectors to the government. The second point is that even in
those instances in which the government can always and costlessly prevent collusion,
there are cases in which it will rationally choose not to. We will show that when
inspectors are corrupted, there is no need for the government to pay high wages, and
in some cases (which depend on the characteristics of the principal-government) the
reduction in enforcement costs more than compensates allowing for bribe exchanges.
Thirdly, we show that introducing self reporting of violations into law enforcement is
an e¤ective tool in law enforcement and has two major e¤ects: it reduces enforcement
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costs in a cleanregime (where incentives are strong enough to prevent corruption), a
point made elsewhere by Kaplow and Shavell; and it allows some governments to shift
from a corrupted regime to a clean one. Finally, we extend the basic model to risk
averse inspectors. We nd that in those cases, the governments wage scheme cannot
avoid paying rents to some of its own inspectors in the case in which there is no self
reporting. However, these rents disappear completely when self reporting is allowed.
This result comes from the fact that self reporting eliminates any uncertainty faced by
the inspector, and therefore the government can avoid paying risk premia. A similar
result can be considered for heterogenous inspectors.
Our approach straddles two literatures, on corruption and self reporting in the con-
text of law enforcement. Since our objective is primarily to show some new properties
of self-reporting, we will use a model from the literature on self reporting, and modify
it by introducing elements from the literature of corruption. The latter has mostly
considered the question of how corruptible law enforcers should be compensated, and
they take the form of moral hazard problems where the principal is generally trying to
maximize a welfare function that does not (generally) depend on the welfare of either
the agent/citizen or the inspector. For example, Mookherjee and Png (1995) consider
a government interested in controlling pollution, and use both sanctions and reward as
means of controlling pollution. Basu et al. (1992) analyze some conditions for the con-
trol of corruption when law enforcers take into account the fact that they may, in turn,
be caught for taking bribes. Marjit and Shi (1998) extend Basu et al. (1992) and show
that when enforcerse¤ort a¤ects the probability of detection, deterrence may become
so diluted that crimes cannot be controlled any longer. Bowels and Garoupa (1997)
discuss bribery control through sanctions. Garoupa and Jellal (2002) extend Bowles
and Garoupa (1997) by considering the e¤ect of asymmetric information on corrup-
tion; they argue that asymmetric information between criminals and law enforcers may
reduce corruption by altering the bargain power in the collusion process. Mookherjee
(1997) consider bribery and extortion in the context of tax evasion allowing the possibil-
ity to use both sanctions and reward. Hindricks, Keen and Muthoo (1999) also analyze
bribery and extortion, considering commissions and penalties as methods of control.
Acemoglu and Verdier (2000) analyze a general equilibrium setting in which preventing
all corruption is too costly and second best intervention may involve a certain frac-
tion of bureaucrats accepting bribes: they propose the payment of e¢ ciency wages to
prevent bribe taking. Hasker and Okten (2005) study the impact of intermediaries on
corruption and show that traditional methods of ghting corruption, i.e. penalty and
rotation, may not be appropriate when interaction between clients, public o¢ cial and
intermediary agents are considered. Kulger et all (2005) analyze competition between
di¤erentiated criminal organizations which also engage in local corruption to avoid pun-
ishment; under certain condition they show that increasing policing and sanctions can
increase the level of criminality.
On the other hand, the literature on law enforcement and self reporting has consid-
ered the moral hazard problem between the government and the criminal while treating
the inspector as a monitoring technology that is costly to implement but not subject
to incentive constraints. In this scenario, self-reporting has many positive character-
istics. Kaplow and Shavell (1994) conclude that self-reporting o¤ers two advantages
over schemes without self-reporting: enforcement resources are saved and risk is re-
duced because criminals who report their behavior bear certain sanctions, rather than
uncertain ones. In a later paper, Kaplow (1995) addresses the issue of law complexity:
greater complexity allows better control of behavior. but more complex rules are more
costly for both individuals and court to understand. Given this setting, he examines
the relationship between rules complexity, welfare and self-reporting of behavior. Innes
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(1999a) studies self-reporting enforcement regimes when the possibility of remediation
is allowed and note that self-reporting rms always engage in e¢ cient remediation and
therefore less enforcement e¤ort is required. Innes (1999b) considers, again, a model in
which a violator can undertake remediation in order to reduce the harm caused. The
paper stresses the importance of self-policing claiming that self-policing increases e¢ -
ciency in two ways: remediation is achieved with certainty and the enforcement e¤ort
cost is often reduced. From a slightly di¤erent perspective, Franzoni (1999) develops
a model of law enforcement in which the prosecutor can negotiate over penalties; the
settlement stage introduces the possibility that maximal sanctions may not be opti-
mal. He shows that the negotiation stage reduces the incentives for the prosecutor to
investigate and increase the rate of noncompliance. Livernois and McKennna (1999),
extend the standard model of enforcement to include a self-reporting and enforcement
power. They nd that under certain conditions, higher compliance rates are achieved
with lower nes for noncompliance. Innes (2000) studies the benet of self-reporting
when criminals have heterogeneous probabilities of apprehension. He shows that e¢ -
ciency can often be increased by inducing violators with high risk of apprehension to
self-report. In the context of tax evasion and revenue maximization, Franzoni (2000)
shows that amnesties (a type of self-reporting) are superior to individual deals since
they allow the agency to reduce tax di¤erential and to extract from taxpayers their
defence costs. Fukuyama et all (2000) study self-reporting systems in the setting of en-
vironmental compliance. Innes (2001) studies self-reporting when violators can perform
"avoidance" activities, which reduce their risk of apprehension. Once these activities
are implemented in the model, self-reporting enforcement regimes are even more ben-
ecial with respect to what was found by prior literature. Feess and Heesen (2002)
consider optimal law enforcement whit self-reporting of behavior. They allow violators
to receive a private signals about their individual probabilities of apprehension after the
crime is committed. They conclude that self-reporting increases social welfare. Motta
and Polo (2003) study competition policy against collusion when leniency programs are
introduced, which reduces nes to rms that leak information to the Antitrust Author-
ity. They show that leniency programs have the double e¤ect of reducing enforcement
cost and encouraging collusion, by decreasing the expected cost for violators. They
conclude that the rst e¤ect dominates the second one, therefore leniency programs are
benecial, especially when the Antitrust Authority has limited resources. Feess and
Walzl (2004) analyze the role self-reporting schemes when criminals are organized in
teams. If the violators engage in cooperative behavior in the self-reporting stage, it is
optimal to impose less than the maximum ne if both individuals self-report. The same
result applied for imperfect self-reporting technologies, i.e. technologies such that the
conviction of one agent does not necessarily imply the conviction of the other. In the
spirit of their previous paper, Feess and Walzl (2005) analyze law enforcement where
self-reporting individuals obtain reduced sanctions: moreover, they distinguish between
two stages: the rst self-reporting stage before the case is investigated and the second
one when the criminal is detected. They show that ne reductions should be adopted
in both stages. Friesen (2006) shows that self-auditing is benecial because it allows
for both self-reporting and self-policing; he concludes that self-auditing is more likely
to be benecial when the violatorsdamages are large. Buccirossi and Spagnolo (2006)
study the e¤ects of leniency programs on sequential, bilateral and illegal transactions.
They nd that leniency programs may end up encouraging occasional sequential illegal
transactions. Feess and Walzl (2006) consider a model of optimal law enforcement with
self-reporting where after violating the law individuals get a private update of their
probability of apprehension. They conclude that under appropriate condition the opti-
mal ne reduction is decreasing in the heterogeneity of the criminals. Sta¤ord (2007)
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uses data on U.S. hazardous waste enforcement and disclosures: their results suggest
that facilities that self-police may be able to strategically disclose in order to decrease
future enforcement.
In nesting the tools used by the corruption literature into a self-reporting setting,
we are preceded by Polinski and Shavell (2001), who introduce a detailed model of
corruption in the Kaplow and Shavell framework: for example, their crooked inspectors
could not just accept bribes from guilty criminals, but also frame and blackmail innocent
citizens. They adopt costly incentives and nes to discourage their bureaucrats from
adopting some deviant behavior, and demonstrate that ghting corruption is a costly
enterprise. Our strategy di¤ers from theirs in that we consider a simplied setting, where
inspectors are agents, and where the cost associated with enforcement and collusion is
the wage bill. When the wage policy is fully endogenized, we are able to design a welfare
function that incorporates the utilities of inspectors and agents alike. Furthermore, we
include self-reporting as an additional tool for the government.
2. THE BASELINE MODEL
There is a number of risk-neutral individuals or citizens of measure 1, who can choose
between performing an illegal act or not. When performing the illegal act, they earn
a certain private benet b, but they impose a cost to society of h. Here, we assume
that some potential criminals would benet more than others from the illegal act; in
particular, we assume that the benet b is distributed with a cdf F (b) with support
[0;1). On the other hand, for convenience we assume that the cost of the act does not
change with the criminal.
The government can monitor the population in search of criminals. To do so, it
hires p inspectors and pays them a wage of w. Each inspector is then paired with a
randomly chosen citizen, and if that citizen turns out to have committed a crime, she
is denounced and made to pay a ne s: We assume that limited liability applies, and
no individual can be charged more than an amount1 s > h. We assume that inspectors
are risk neutral, maximize their private prots, and have a reservation wage equal to
c, which corresponds to what they could earn if working outside of the police force.
Given p and s, an individual will commit a crime only when the benet exceeds the
expected ne:
b > ps
and thus the total mass of citizens who commit a crime is 1  F (ps).
The cost of enforcing the law consists on the wage bill paid to the inspector force,
pw, minus the revenues coming from the nes that are paid by those who were caught
infringing the law, which amount to a fraction p(1   F (ps)) of law-breakers. The gov-
ernment has an administrative cost  2 [0; 1] in processing each ne s that it receives,
such that net revenues from nes are p(1 F (ps))s. The parameter  can be thought
of administrative e¢ ciency and how developed is the judicial system. We also make
an important assumption about the nancing costs of law enforcement. Following Laf-
font and Tirole (1991), we assume that the government raises the funds needed to pay
inspectors through ine¢ cient taxation, such that enforcement costs the taxpayers
(1 + ) [pw   p(1  F (ps))s]
1As in Kaplow and Shavell (1994) we specify this assumption to rule out the corner solution where
the optimal probability of apprehension equals one. The relaxation of this assumption doesnt a¤ect
our results.
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where   0 is a paramenter that describes how e¢ cient the government is in raising
taxes. When  = 0; resources are costlessly shifted from taxpayers to the police force
and there is no welfare loss in that operation; when  > 0; there is a welfare loss
equivalent to  [pw   p(1  F (ps))s] : As it will become clear, the assumption that 
is positive is an essential component of our model for two reasons. First, enforcement
would be costless otherwise, and the government would always want to achieve a rst
best level of criminality.
Taking all these elements in consideration, the government maximizes a welfare
function that is the sum of the utilities of citizens and inspectors, and is reduced to the
following expression:
max
p;s;w
W (p; s; w) =
Z 1
ps
(b  h)f(b)db  p [w   s(1  F (ps))] (1)
This function is subject to participation and incentives constraints, the nature of
which changes depending on the assumptions made. We then begin by considering the
simplest case of no collusion, and obtain two baseline results: an equilibrium crime and
welfare when there is no self reporting of crimes, and when criminals are allowed to
turn themselves in; the remaining sections will introduce collusion between criminals
and inspectors.
2.1. Law enforcement without self-reporting
2.1.1. No collusion
In this baseline case with no moral hazard there are no incentive constraints on the
welfare function, and the optimal levels of p and s are obtained by maximizing (1). In
our setting, the optimal ne is the maximum ne possible, s. Suppose the ne is not
maximal and set to some s < s. Then, the government could raise s a little bit and
at the same time lower p in such a way that ps does not change at all. The integral
portion of the welfare function does not change, nor do the revenues from collecting the
ne; but by lowering p, the government reduces the cost of enforcement pw. Note that
this argument applies to all the variants that are considered in this paper, and therefore
we will always write the ne as s: Secondly, because there is no moral hazard, the
government can set the wage equal to the inspector outside option c. p is determined
by maximizing the function
max
p
Wnc(p) =
Z 1
ps
(b  h)f(b)db  p [c   s(1  F (ps))] (2)
using Leibniz rule, we obtain that the rst order conditions for p have the form
dWnc
dp
= s(h  ps)f(ps)   [c   s(1  F (ps)) + psf(ps)s] (3)
If c is su¢ ciently large, this expression may be negative: this implies the possibility
for pnc to be equal to zero. Moreover p

nc = 1 is also possible: note that we shall rule
out this result since it implies that the cost of enforcement,c, is actually lower than the
revenues obtained by the convicted criminals. This case is note particularly interesting
for the purpose of our analysis because it entails that law enforcement produces any
welfare loss. The interior solution is determined by
pncs =
1
(1 + )

h  c

[sf(pncs)]
+
(1  F (pncs))
f(pncs)

(4)
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Note that the socially optimal level of pncs when the costs to society can be fully
privatized is h: welfare is increased when crimes are accomplished by those whose
private benet exceeds h. With costly enforcement, ps < h and crime exceeds the
socially optimal level.
2.1.2. Collusion
We now consider the possibility that the criminal can bribe inspectors in case the
inspectors discovers her. The inspector makes a take-it-or-leave-it o¤er m to the agent
for not disclosing his identity to the judiciary. If the criminal refuses the o¤er, the
inspector will report her, and she will pay the full ne s. If she accepts the o¤er, then a
bribe is exchanged and no report is made. We make the standard assumption made by
La¤onte and Tirole (1991) that the side contract between the two agents is self-enforcing;
however, we also attach a probability l(m) that somehow the side deal is detected by the
judiciary system. When the bribe is detected, the inspector is red and loses both bribe
and wage w, while the criminal is prosecuted and made to pay an amount up to his
limited liability s: The function l(m) is increasing in m: the higher the bribe, the higher
the likelyhood that the collusion is uncovered. We further assume that l is exogenously
given. This is in line with some of the literature on collusion2 , where inspectors are
caught in the fact by chance or by colleagues who leak the information to the judiciary
system. In this context, the function l(m) is an indicator of how transparent the law
enforcement system is: for any givenm0, ~l(m0) > l(m0) indicates that the second country
lacks transparency or ability to prosecute petty corruption. To keep the model simple
we assume that l(m) is a step function:
l(m) =

1 if m > s
0 if m  s
This assumption keeps the model manageable without a¤ecting the implications. It is
also a parsimonius description of how easy it is to detect collusion: the case where  is
small or zero corresponds to societies where bribes are not an acceptable alternative to
paying nes; a high  instead corresponds to potentially more corrupt societies, where
even outrageous instances of bribery go either undetected or unprosecuted. The other
advantage of this formulation of the probability of detection is that it implies a simple
equilibrium bribe. For the deal to take place, the bribe must be high enough such that
inspector accepts it (m  0) but low enough to go undetected (m  s). the exchanged
bribe is
m =
1
2
s
Note that for simplicity it is assumed that the two parties have equal weights in the
Nash bargain, this assumption doesnt a¤ect any our results3 .
We show that the government has two possible ways to respond to the possibility of
collusion. It could maintain a cleanregime by paying an incentive wage which provides
a premium to those inspectors that report a criminal. Alternatively, It could maintain
a corruptedregime by paying below-market level wages to inspector with the implicit
2See for example Besley and McClaren (1993) and Mookherjee and Png (1995)
3Basu et al. (1992) analyze some conditions for the control of corruption when law enforcers take
into account the fact that they may, in turn, be caught for taking bribes. Marjit and Shi (1998) extend
Basu et al. (1992) and show that when enforcerse¤ort a¤ects the probability of detection, deterrence
may become so diluted that crimes can be controlled any longer. Nevertheless our results would not
be a¤ected by introductioning this extension.
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understanding that any di¤erence in wages will be made up by collecting bribes. We
analyze them in turn.
Clean regime The government could set up a two tiered payment system for its
inspectors. It pays a xed wage w to all inspectors, and an additional incentive v to
the fraction of its inspectors who report a criminal. In order for the inspector to weakly
prefer reporting the criminal (as opposed to accepting the bribe), the government must
pay an incentive equal to s in case inspector discovers an illegal act. At the same time,
the government must ensure that the expected reward to the inspector is at least as
large as its reservation wage c. Thus, the government can avoid collusion by ensuring
that the following constraints hold:
IC : w + (1  a)v  w + (1  a)s (5)
PC : w + (1  a)v  c (6)
where 1  a is the probability of discovering an illegal act. In order to maximize the
utility function (NUMBER), these two contraints must bind with equality, in which case
v = s and w = c   (1  a)v. With this system of incentives, inspectors always report
the criminals, who then still face an expected ne of ps; thus, a = F (ps). Successful
crime detection yields revenues equivalent to p(1  F (ps))s, and therefore the overall
governments expected cost associated with hiring the inspectors and preventing them
from being corrupted is given by p[w + s(1  F (ps))( + )] and the welfare function
becomes
Wi(pi) = max
p
Z 1
ps
(b  h)f(b)db  p [c   (1  F (ps))s] (7)
which is exactly the same as in the case without moral hazard (1): Wi(p) =Wnp(p)
so that pi = pnc. Note that in this version of the model, corruption has no cost to
society, unlike what was found by Polinski and Shavell (2001) in a setting very similar
to ours: indeed, since the seminal paper by Becker and Stigler (1974),in which they show
that corruption among law enforcers may dilute deterrence and consequently reduce the
extent to which laws and sanctions can e¤ectively control criminality, the literature
on crime has started to analyze the issue of corruption among law enforcers, mostly
considering corruption as a negative phenomenon to be challenged. The reason for our
surprising result is that when enforcement costs are fully endogenized, the government
can manipulate wages in such a way that in expectation inspectors always get their
reservation utility, and therefore obtain the level of criminality that would have prevailed
without moral hazard. Deadweight losses can be incorporated into this framework in
a number of ways. For instance, we could specify the utility of the inspectors to be
Leontief, in which case the base wage must always be w = c and bonuses cannot
be discounted from the base pay. While the deadweight loss is most apparent (and
the analysis simplest) in the case of inite risk aversion, the argument carries over for
inspectors who are risk averse, as it will become clear in the rst of our extensions.
Another possible reason for the inability of incentives to fully eliminate collusion may
arise from heterogeneity among inspectors. This case will also be analyzed in the section
that follows.
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Corrupted regime Even with risk-neutral and homogeneous inspectors, a govern-
ment may in fact choose to allow corruption to ourish. The manipulation of wages
allows the government to adopt another alternative wage policy that allows for collusion
but saves on monitoring costs. To see how this argument works in the model, suppose
that wages are wc < c, the outside option of the inspectors, and that no contingency
payments are given out. Under normal circumstances we would expect that the gov-
ernment is unable to hire anyone for the job. However, because inspectors have the
possibility to supplement their income with bribes, they would be willing to work for
the lower wage as long as their expected earning (wages + bribes) is greater or equal
to the outside option. The expected earnings derived from extracting bribes are equal
to the bribe amount, m; times the probability that the inspector encounters a crimi-
nal, 1   F (pm). Thus, the participation constraint (6) under a corrupt regime is now
changed to be
CPC : wc  c  m(1  F (m)) (8)
and, as before, this constraint will be binding: there is a welfare loss associated with
providing inspectors with excess salaries. Note that inspectors will take bribes not only
when incentive wages are not o¤ered, but also when they are o¤ered but they are too
low, that is, when (5) does not bind: v < m: Suppose then that v > 0 is o¤ered but
the IC is violated. The joint payo¤ from having a side deal between inspectors and
criminals is s  v, and the equilibrium bribe paid out will be
m =

1
2 (v + s) if v < s
0 if v  s (9)
where for simplicity it is assumed that the two parties have equal weights in the Nash
bargain (it will become evident that there are no changes to any formulas if we relax this
assumption to a more general case). The higher the incentive v, the higher the bribe
that is exchanged; at the same time, the higher the bribe, the lower the criminality4 .
Thus, a government that chooses to allow criminality to ourish is still able to a¤ect
the number of crimes by using its wage policy to a¤ect the bribe levels. It is then as if
the government is choosing the bribe itself to meet its goals:
max
p;v
Wc(p;m; v) =
Z 1
pm
(b  h)f(b)db  p [c  m(1  F (pm))] (10a)
st : CIC1 : m =
1
2
(v + s) (10b)
: CIC2 : m  s (10c)
the choice variable v enters into the maximization only once, in CIC1, and it is the
tool used by the government to change the equilibrium bribe. We now show that v
should always be chosen such that CIC2 binds. Suppose that CIC2 does not bind, and
a level ~p; ~m < s is selected. Then, the government could increase m and reduce p such
that mp = ~m~p. The integral portion of the welfare function is unchanged, and so is the
function F (pm); however, the government has now saved  (~p  p) c and is therefore
strictly better o¤. The welfare achieved by the country is then
Wc(p) =
Z 1
ps
(b  h)f(b)db  pc + ps(1  F (ps)) (11)
4The fact that higher incentive incrases the level of bribe has been already highlighted in other
articles: see for example Mookherjee and Png (1995), Mooherjees (1997), Hindricks, Keen and Muthoo
(1999).
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The equilibrium level of crime can be shown to be
pcs =
1
1 + 

h  
sf(pcs)
wc

=
1
1 + 

h  c

sf(pcs)
+
(1  F (pcs)
f(pcs)

(12)
The formula is somewhat similar to (4); and in fact the two are identical when
 = 1: in that case, pnc = pc. However, for a more general case it is not possible to
say whether there is more or less crime under corruption than under a clean regime, a
feature that is common to other model that use a similar setup as ours.
So far, we have demonstrated that a government that faces collusion can choose to
operate in two di¤erent regimes; we now take on the issue of which regime is ultimately
selected.
In summary we have the following proposition,
Proposition 1. The optimal wage policy o¤ered by a law enforcement agency when
agents are corruptible can be one of the following:(a) when incentives are paid, there is
no side payments between criminals and law enforcers, and outcomes mirror the rst
bestcase without moral hazard, (b) when a capitulation wage is o¤ered, law enforcers
are paid below-market wages, but are allowed to supplement their income with bribes. In
general, there will be more criminality under this regime than under a cleanregime.
2.1.3. Optimal regime choice
In this section we compare the two wage regimes that we have identied. Note
that the government will select between a corrupt or a clean regime by independently
maximizing (7) and (11) and comparing the two levels of welfare. It is evident that
the government will not automatically choose a clean regime over a corrupted one: the
choice depends critically on the levels of the parameters in the model, particularly 
and : Figure 1 and 2 show how (7) and (11) evaluated at their respective optimal as
these two parameters of interest vary. (7) is strictly increasing in , and (11) is strictly
increasing in . A simple proof is proposed for , the same applied also for  : consider
any given level of pc , then if  is increased it is always possible to lower p

c such that
the product pc is unchanged, and so the level of criminality is unchanged, but the
cost of law enforcement is reduced. Therefore, the welfare function (11) evaluated at its
optimal must be strictly increasing in .
s
*
cW
Figure 1
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Figure 2
In order to compare the two wage regimes we consider two decision loci representing
values of  and  for which the government would be indi¤erent between any of the two
regimes. We do so by comparing (7) and (11): the corrupted regime, i.e. capitulation
wages, and the clean regime, i.e. e¢ ciency wages, yield the same level of welfare if and
only if,
 =
R1
pcs
(b  h)f(b)db  R1
pis
(b  h)f(b)db  pcc+ pic+ pcs(1  F (pcs))
pi(1  F (pis))s (13)
It is easy to establish that (13) is increasing in . Indeed, the welfare function (11)
evaluated at its optimal is strictly increasing in , while (7) is una¤ected by any change
in . Therefore, by di¤erentiating (13) we obtain that  must be an increasing function
of . This function is illustrated as the curve in Figure 3. The corrupted regime always
dominates the clean regime at the bottom of the box: moreover when  =  = 1, (7)
and (11) evaluated at their respective optimal yields the same level of welfare. On the
other hand, when  = 1 e¢ ciency wages always dominate capitulation wages for any
value of .
0 s
a
1
1
Corrupted
Clean
Figure 3
We see that for countries facing low levels of  it is often better to allow for collusion,
because the side deals between inspectors and criminals is more e¢ cient than formal
punishment through the judiciary system. Similarly, a country with low levels of  is
more likely to remain clean, because the regime is so transparent (or the level of morals
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so high) that any form of bribing is discovered and denounced right away. The graph
paints a reasonable picture in which countries with ine¢ cient or ine¤ectual bureocracies
(low ) tend to be corrupt, and countries with transparent systems and little potential
corruption (low  - we are thinking Nordic countries, for example) do not have a corrupt
regime. Comparing (7) and (11), the corrupted regime dominates the clean one if and
only ifR1
pcs
(b  h)f(b)db  R1
pis
(b  h)f(b)db  pcc + pic + pcs(1  F (pcs))
pi(1  F (pis))s     0
(14)
We can now summerize our results,
Proposition 2. Countries characterized by ine¢ cient bureaucracies, i.e. su¢ -
ciently low , and ine¢ cient transparency, i.e. su¢ ciently high , such that (14) holds,
shall choose to let corruption ourish, even though they could choose a clean regime.
2.2. Law enforcement with self reporting
Self reporting commands a ourishing literature in the economics of law enforcement,
beginning with Kaplow and Shavell (1994). The main point coming from this literature
is that self-reporting allows the government to cut law enforcement costs in a manner of
ways. KS, in a set up very similar to ours, showed that when self reporting is allowed, all
criminals prefer to pay a reduced ne and turn themselves in rather than waiting to get
caught by the police, which leads to fewer inspectors needed. There is a sense, prevalent
in the media, that allowing for discounts based on self reporting or even amnesties are
a form of corruption by itself, as they correspond to the criminal o¢ cially bribingher
way out of her harsh and deserved punishment. Yet, we show that self reporting is
a good tool against corruption, when that is dened to be a side agreement between
criminals and the police force.
2.2.1. No collusion
We start by considering the case without collusion, which is similar to the original
Kaplow and Shavell. Suppose that the government allows the citizens to turn themselves
in if they commit the crime and pay a reduced ne r. KS show that, in that situation,
the government would set the reduced ne to be the certainty equivalent of the full ne,
r = ps, and that when it does so, every citizen that commits a crime pays the reduced
ne. As a consequence, the government needs to hire enough policemen to control only
the honest people who did not commit the crime. The welfare function becomes,
max
p
W srnc(p) =
Z 1
ps
(b  h)f(b)db  p [F (ps)c   s(1  F (ps))] (15)
where again ps(1   F (ps)) are the revenues from the reduced ne (and not, as
before, from the full nes). Note that we are maintaining the assumption that there
is a leakage in revenues, even though it may be reasonable to assume that, since self-
reporting involves an admission of fault, the government does not have to spend as much
money demonstrating culpability in a court of law. We choose to maintain this leakage
because we demonstrate that the benets from self reporting go beyond a streamlined
bureocratic process, which adds above and beyond what we will show in this section.
Compare (15) with (1): the only modication to the maximization comes from
having pF (ps)c as opposed to pc: Any p that is desired without self reporting can
be achieved with self reporting with fewer inspectors. We will often refer to this social
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welfare function (15), and to the arguments p that maximize it, as the rst-best outcomes
under self reporting.
psrncs =
1
(1 + )

h  c
F (psrncs)
[sf(psrncs)]
+
(1  F (psrncs)
f(psrncs)

(16)
the solution indicates that pnc < psrnc; crime and enforcement costs are lower when
self reporting is allowed. It is then a preferred policy.
We now compare the two possible regimesclean and corruptwhen the government
allows self-reporting of crimes; we will then proceed to compare how the presence of
self-reporting may a¤ect the type of regime the government chooses.
In summary,
Proposition 3. When self-reporting is introduced: (a) all violators report having
commit the harmful act, (b) the optimal probability psrnc is given by equation (16).
2.2.2. Collusion
Clean regime Again, in this regime we allow a schedule of payments to policemen
that vary depending on whether they reported a criminal. The use of incentive wages
guarantees that no police o¢ cer is ever corrupted, and therefore guarantees that all
criminals who are caught face charges equal to s. Because of that, the reduced ne that
applies is now equal to r = ps, or the ne that was used in the rst-best (no collusion)
scenario. It is straightforward to show that the welfare function to be maximized is
max
p
W sri (p) =
Z 1
ps
(b  h)f(b)db  p [F (ps)c   s(1  F (ps))] (17)
Note that this is the same as equation (3), and therefore it achieves the highest
welfare possible: psri = p
sr
nc .Why? First, it is clear that the number of crimes remained
at their rst best: committing a crime is not cheap because of high reduced nes, and
because when those reduced nes are not paid out, it is not possible to bribe o¢ cials
and pay a bribe. Secondly, since all criminals report, inspectors need to monitor a small
population, thus reducing the number of policemen. Finally, while incentive wages
guarantee that policemen are not going to take bribes, self reporting ensures that no
incentive payments are actually given. Since all criminals voluntarily report their crime
and pay the fee to the government, no criminals are actually discovered by policemen.
In order to meet the IC constraint, inspectors need to receive a base wage w = c:
Given our results, we have the following proposition.
Proposition 4. Given any enforcement scheme under a clean regime without self
reporting, there exists a scheme with self reporting that is welfare improving, i.e. behav-
ior is the same but enforcement costs are lower.
Note that this comparison understates the advantage of the optimal self-reporting
scheme over the optimal scheme without self-reporting, because generally the two opti-
mal probabilities of detection, pslnc and pncdi¤er.
Corrupted regime We show in the appendix that capitulation wages are not com-
patible with self-reporting. Intuitively, this results may be explained in the following
fashion: since under self-reporting all violators report having commit the harmful act,
it follows that the government can no longer set wages below inspectorsoutside option.
In summary we have the following proposition.
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Proposition 5. A government that allows for self reporting but does not pay high
enough incentives to satisfy (5) will always choose a reduced ne that is too expensive.
The welfare reached is then equal to (11).
2.2.3. Optimal regime choice
A choice must be done by a government facing corruption among its inspectors:
either it chooses corruption to continue and pay capitulation wages, or it must intro-
duce incentive wages, self reporting, and clean out corruption. Any other choice is not
optimal. In this section we compare the two wage regimes that we have identied. As
before, the government will select between a corrupt or a clean regime by independently
maximizing (17) and (11) and comparing the two levels of welfare.
In order to compare the two wage regimes we consider two decision loci representing
values of  and  for which the government would be indi¤erent between any of the two
regimes. We do so by comparing (17)) and (11): the corrupted regime, i.e. capitulation
wages, and the self-reporting clean regime, i.e. e¢ ciency wages plus self-reporting, yield
the same level of welfare if and only if,
 =
R1
pcs
(b  h)f(b)db  R1
psri s
(b  h)f(b)db  pcc + psri cF (psri s) + pcs(1  F (pcs))
psri (1  F (psri s))s
(18)
It is easy to establish that (18) is again increasing in , like in the previous case
when self-reporting was not allowed. In order to compare this result with the previous
one, dene s as the value of  such that (18) holds: on the other hand we denominate
ns the value of  such that (13) holds. Comparing (18) with (13) we conclude that
given any enforcement scheme under a clean regime without self reporting, there exists
a scheme with self reporting, which implies s  ns. Suppose that self-reporting is
not allowed, then for any given value of , countries characterized by a low level of
e¢ ciency  2 [0; ns] shall choose to let corruption ourish by adopting capitulation
wages. When self-reporting is introduced, the fraction of countries with a level of
e¢ ciency  2 [s; ns] shall instead choose to clean the system from corruption.
By di¤erentiating (18) we obtain that s must be an increasing function of . This
function is illustrated as the lower curve in Figure 4. The corrupted regime always
dominates the clean regime at the bottom of the box: di¤erently form the previous
case, when  =  = 1, the clean regime always dominates the corrupted one. Moreover,
when  = 1 the clean regime always dominate capitulation wages for any value of .
We can therefore plot the graph for a given distribution function F (:);
Self-
reporting
s
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1
Corrupted
Clean
0 1
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The grey zone in Figure 4 represents the decision loci that was previously dominated
by capitulation wages and that is now dominated by the clean regime.
In summary we obtained the following results,
Proposition 6. When police o¢ cers are corruptible and self reporting of crimes
is allowed: (a) capitulation wages cannot be o¤ered (b) having incentive wages allows
the government to the rst best level of criminality and rst best social welfare (c) a
fraction of countries with a level of e¢ ciency  2 [s; ns] shall now choose to clean
the system from corruption, whereas without self-reporting the would have preferred to
adopt capitulation wages, by accepting corruption to widespread.
3. EXTENSIONS
3.1. Risk Aversion
In our discussion, we have used as examples a risk neutral, homogeneous inspector,
and showed that in that case, there are no costs associated with avoiding collusion. But
costs from avoiding collusion arise immediately if we consider a more general setting
where inspectors are risk averse, or where they are heterogeneous. Because the implica-
tions are similar, we study here only the case of risk aversion. To make the analysis even
simpler, suppose that all inspectors are innitely risk averse (Leontief utility function)5 .
In that case, the incentive and compatibility constraints are now as follows:
ICRA : w + (1  a)v  w + (1  a)s
PCRA : w  c
Thus, the incentive remains as before, v = s; but the government cannot lower the
base wage. Under this system, those o¢ cials who do not catch any criminals obtain a
utility of c; whereas those who catch a criminal obtain c+s: All in all, the additional
cost of maintaining an incentive scheme is ps(1  F (ps)); and the welfare function is
WRAi (p
RA
i ) = max
p
Z 1
ps
(b  h)f(b)db  p [c   (1  )(1  F (ps))s]
Comparing WRAi with Wi; we have that
WRAi (p) Wi(p) = ps(1  F (ps))
which is what we dene as the cost of collusion.
Now, suppose that self reporting is allowed, and set to be r = psrncs, that is, the level
that would be chosen if there was a clean regime and the inspectors are all risk neutral.
Also, let inspectors earn a base wage w and an incentive wage s that is contingent
on catching a criminal. In this case, the following will happen: all guilty citizens will
self report their crime; no incentives will ever be paid out; and therefore w = c. The
welfare achieved is then exactly equivalent to (17), and the cost of collusion is entirely
eliminated.
The reason for this result is straightforward: under corruption, inspectors receive an
uncertain income that depends on whether they report criminals. When these inspectors
are risk averse, they must be paid a wasteful risk premium over the certainty equivalent
5Using innite risk aversion simplies the formulas, but we can show the same results for less extreme
cases.
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c, and this premium is socially wasteful. Self reporting is a way to eliminate uncertainty
in the payo¤ function of the inspector, since now controls are done only on honest people.
This last property of self reporting would also work if we consider heterogeneous
inspectors: for example, when a small number of inspectors turn out to be very good
at capturing criminals, they earn rents under anti-corruption schemes. These rents will
be eliminated by self reporting.
3.2. Heterogeneity in morals
Apart form risk aversion, in this section we consider also heterogeneous inspectors.
They are of two types:  are dishonest and 1    are honest. Similarly to Beslay and
McLaren (1993), dishonesty is dened as an immutable characteristic of preferences -
an honest person regards his integrity as priceless and thus will not take a bribe, while
a dishonest person will maximise his expected income. While dishonesty is immutable
it is possible, therefore, to make a dishonest person behave honestly by making it in his
or her interest to do so. For the sake of semplicity we will assume dishonest inspectors
to be risk neutral: relaxing this assumption wouldnt change any of our results.
Our previous discussion remains unchanged with respect to capitulation wages and
incentive wages: note that capitulation wages are applicable only to dishonest inspec-
tors, it follows that if pc   then the government is not able to hire enough inspectors
as it would be optimal under the corrupted regime. In this case the government can
only assume pc =  inspectors. It follows that, under capitulation wages, welfare is
strictly increasing in  when the condition, pc  , is binding. The welfare function can
be written as follow,
WHc (p) =
Z 1
s
(b  h)f(b)db  c + s(1  F (s))
s:t: pc  
Graphically this can be illustred for a generic distribution function,
q
*
cW
pc
Figure 7
More interestingly when heterogeneity is introduced an additional wage policy can be
considered: reservation (or market) wages. By doing so the government can hire both
honest and dishonest inspector, under the implicit understanding that the dishonest
ones will accept the bribe. The welfare function takes the following form,
max
p
Wnc(p) =
Z 1
ps+ps(1 )
(b h)f(b)db p [c   s(1  )(1  F (ps + ps(1  )))]
(19)
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It is easy to establish that (19) is strictly decreasing in  and strictly increasing in 
and . Figure 5 and 6 show how (19) evaluated at its optimal as these two parameters
of interest vary.
q
*
mW
Figure 5
s
*
mW
Figure 6
In order to compare incentive wage regimes with market wages we consider two
decision loci representing values of  and  for which the government would be indi¤erent
between any of the two regimes. We do so by comparing (17) and (19):
Z 1
pis
(b  h)f(b)db  pi [c   (1  )(1  F (pis))s]
 
Z 1
pms+pms(1 )
(b  h)f(b)db  pm [c   (1  )(1  F (pms + pms(1  )))s] = 0
By di¤erentiating this equation we obtain that  must be an increasing function of
. This function is illustrated as the curve IM in Figure 8. Consider the choice between
market and capitulation wages by comparing (11) and (19). In this instance, we obtain
Z 1
pcs
(b  h)f(b)db  pcc + pcs(1  F (pcs))
 
Z 1
pms+pms(1 )
(b  h)f(b)db  pm [c   (1  )(1  F (pms + pms(1  )))s] = 0
without any futher specication of our model, it is not possible to show whether  is
an increasing or decreasing function of . This is represented as the generic line CM in
Fig. 8 . When  =  = 1, capitulation wages always weakly dominates market wages.
Moreover, when  = 0 the market regime always dominate capitulation wages for any
value of .
Finally, in order to confront capitulation wages and e¢ ciency wages we compare
(7) and (11): the corrupted regime, i.e. capitulation wages, and the clean regime, i.e.
e¢ ciency wages, yield the same level of welfare if and only if,
Z 1
pis
(b  h)f(b)db  pi [c   (1  )(1  F (pis))s] (20)
 
Z 1
ps
(b  h)f(b)db  pcc + pcs(1  F (pcs)) = 0
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By di¤erentiating (20) it is easy to establish that  is a decreasing function of . It is
illustrated as the curve IC in Fig. 8. With these schedules in place, we can characterise
the parameter values in which each of the wage strategies is optimal. They are labelled as
MW, EW and CW, standing for market, e¢ ciency and capitulation wages, respectively.
To describe our results we shall plot the three decision loci for various parameter values.
s
1
1
EW
0 q
MW
CW
Figure 8
It is easy to show that also in this case, self-reporting dominates both market wages
and e¢ ciency wages. By comparing capitulation wages and self-reporting regime we
add to the graph an extra dotted line,
s
1
1
0 q
CW
Self reporting
This results is coherent with the rest of our analysis: by allowing citizens to avoid
all monitoring by reporting their own violations rst, the government is able to increase
welfare by hiring fewer inspector, and in some instances by shifting from a regime of
corruption to a regime where there is none. Most papers on amnesties have taken the
view that the latter can be justied only from the point of view of myopic governments
looking for short-term gains in exchange for larger longer term losses, including diluted
deterrence and reduced e¤ectiveness of laws and sanctions. Our results is actually the
opposite. Adopting self-reporting, i.e. moderate amnesties, as a way to reduce collusion,
the government is actually competing with its own inspector in the attempt to induce
the agents to self-report. Note that more standard instruments against corruption
entail competing against criminals by incetivizing the inspectors to refuse bribery. In
the context of our model amnesties are preferable to standard anti corruption-policies,
particularly in countries with lower levels of judicial development and lower morals.
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4. CONCLUSION
Our paper indicates some properties of self reporting of crimes in law enforcement
that have not been considered in the past. Self reporting reduced corruption in law
enforcement by providing an outside option to criminals, who can choose to come clean
directly with the govenrment instead of through the police force. Self reporting is strictly
benecial for governments who already have in place an e¤ective incentive schemes to
prevent collusion by reducing enforcement costs. These savings come from two sources.
The rst source, already identied in the literature, is that the number of controls
needed to maintain a certain level of crime is now reduced. The second comes from the
elimination of any rents that in some cases must be paid to some inspectors: these rents
come from either risk aversion, or from heterogeneity of inspectors.
Self reporting also benets some governments which, in the absence of this tool,
would have rather let corruption prevail. By adding self reporting many more govern-
ments would be able to switch from corrupt regimes to clean ones. To domonstrate
this, we have considered a range of countries with institutional weaknesses along two
directions: the rst is that the government is unable or unwilling to either nd or prose-
cute gross instances of bribe taking; the second may be that ine¢ cient judicial systems
makes prosecuting criminals too expensive, and the government may prefer to let in-
formal punishmentas a form of a bribe to take place. In our model, self reporting does
not solve either of these problems; however, it makes them less relevant, and in many
cases it tips the government to clean up corruption.
5. APPENDIX
Proposition 5. If the government chooses an incorrect mix of reduced nes and
incentive payments, she may not be able to achive the welfare level in (15). In fact, self
reporting will not achieve a clean regime unless it is coupled by incentive wages.
To see why, suppose v = 0: The government now must choose a policy wsrc that
satisties contraint (8) and a reduced ne r. At this point, the criminal can choose to
either pay the reduced ne or to bribe an o¢ cial in the event of being caught; it will
choose the bribe m if pm  r: Now, suppose for a moment that the criminal chooses not
to pay the reduced bribe and is caught by the inspector. The criminal now can either
pay a bribe or the full ne s, and therefore the equilibrium bribe amount (9) applies.
In our example, we have set v = 0, and thus m = 12s: Note that this equilibrium bribe
does not depend at all on the reduced ne, and thus the government cannot o¤er a
reduced ne that is greater than 12s:
We now analyze the optimal response of the government, who must choose what
reduced ne to set. She has two alternatives: set it low enough that it binds (and
avoids collusion) or high enough that it does not bind and lets collusion happen.
case 1 Suppose r  pm = 12ps; and all criminals prefer the reduced ne than the
bribe. Then, the government obtains revenues of r(1  F (r)) and must maximize the
function
~Wc(p; r) =
Z 1
r
(b  h)f(b)db  pc + r(1  F (r))
st : r  1
2
ps
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The constraint must bind with equality: if not, p can be lowered without a¤ecting
r, and since fewer inspectors are hired, income increases. This reduces to
~Wc(p) =
Z 1
1
2ps
(b  h)f(b)db  pc + 

1
2
ps(1  F (1
2
ps))

(21)
case 2 Now suppose that r > pm = 12ps; and all criminals prefer paying the
bribe. The government can adjust wages downward and still hire inspectors, but it will
not derive any revenues from the nes since all inspectors are accepting bribes equal to
1
2ps. In this scenario, the welfare function to be maximized is simply
Wc(p) =
Z 1
1
2ps
(b  h)f(b)db  pc + 

1
2
ps(1  F (1
2
ps))

(22)
Compare (21) with (22): for any possible p; Wc(p)  ~Wc(p) = (1 )

1
2ps(1  F ( 12ps))

>
0: Thus, when the government chooses to violate (5), she will always choose a regime
in which self reporting constraints are not binding.
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